This essay seeks to investigate the extent to which legal practice permeated the fur¥ c literature. The uniformity of legal literature argues in favour of such influence. This is perhaps due to the fact that both theoretical and practical legal literature were written by the same authors who were often also legal professionals 10 .
sorb and adapt to legal practice, investigating specifically the incorporation of legal practice into the Sharia, using the Malikite law of procedure up to the 6 th /12 th century as an example.
The Sharia has been elaborated by legal scholars (fuqahå') and laid down in their writings. This literature embodies works of diverse dimension, genre and purpuse, such as theoretical works of law (uß¥l literature) and monographs concerning special legal topics, short manuals for legal studies and very extensive reference law texts (fur¥ It is likely that there exists a special relationship between literature and legal practice because the authors of these writings were not only legal scholars but also quËåt, muft¥n or other officials 9 . The qåË• decided the outcome of lawsuits and in this way formed legal precedents, whereas the muft• only offered legal opinions. Thus he also influenced legal relationships as his opinions were often observed by the qåË• in settling disputes. Other officials applied the Sharia within the scope of their official activities, for example when exercising their juridical functions or exacting religious taxes. It is therefore improbable that scholars who solved legal questions speculatively and wrote a theoretical system of law would at the same time apply a different law in practice.
This essay seeks to investigate the extent to which legal practice permeated the fur¥ c literature. The uniformity of legal literature argues in favour of such influence. This is perhaps due to the fact that both theoretical and practical legal literature were written by the same authors who were often also legal professionals 10 .
Initially, legal practice influenced the Sharia in so far as it had permeated into the Koran or ˙ad•th. There cases and general practical proceedings are described from which institutions, regulations and single rules of law are derived. The legal practice which has influenced the Sharia in this way is static and historical in nature. The Koran and ˙ad•th are invariable texts of the first Islamic centuries and thus fall outside the remit of this study. Instead, attention will be drawn to the extent to which formerly current legal practice permeated the Sharia and the lawbooks. We shall attempt to understand the Sharia's adjustment to various alterations in society over time. We have therefore examined the procedural regulations of the most important Malikite lawbooks up to the 6 th /12 th century for relevant material.
B. Analysis of the Malikite Procedural Law with regard to Legal Practice

I. Legal Institutions and Regulations close to Legal Practice
The close relationship of legal institutions and regulations to legal practice is demonstrated by various criteria. The description of irrelevant circumstances, complex and unusual details and technical subject matter all indicate practical origin of actual cases.
Cases in lawbooks derive from legal practice, if their facts are based in reality. It is therefore important to also examine the specific details.
Irrelevant Circumstances
The Mudauwana discusses a case in which a traveller maintains that he hired a horse or a camel to Mecca for the price of 100 Dirham. The owner of the animal maintains that a price of 200 Dirham only to Medina was agreed. According to an anonymous opinion reported by Ibn al-Qåsim
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, both parties are plaintiffs (mudda c ¥n), the owner concerning the claimed surplus (faËla) 12 of 100 Dirham, the traveller concerning the more distant city of Mecca. The case is described without specifically identifying the individuals involved. The exact tariff and destination are not intrinsic to the resolu-tion of the case, but they considerably facilitate comprehension. We can therefore not
conclude that these specifications demonstrate a basic in fact.
In another account, Ibn al-Qåsim presents the following opinion (qaul) Ibn al-Qåsim reports on the following regulation in the same text. Målik was presented a case in which a slave confessed (iqrår) to having stepped forcibly on a child's toe, amputating it and causing much bleeding. Målik's opinion was that the slave's confession would be acceptable in the case of a recent injury 16 . The confession is credible as the bleeding indicates the slave truly caused injury. The case was presented in the abstract because the individuals involved were not identified. The only relevant facts are the slave's confession and the child's injury. The specifics of the bleeding and the resulting loss of the toe are to be considered incidental information to the judgement. Especially the loss of the toe seems to indicate that this case is not altogether an abstract invention.
In the Mudauwana, we find the discussion of a blind man's testimony in a divorce case (ãalåq). Ibn al-Qåsim tells us that Målik allowed the testimony of a man who overheard his neighbour divorce his wife behind a wall. The witness was not able to see his neighbour, but identified him by his voice. Former scholars of the Hedschas, Irak and Egypt also admitted such testimony 17 . From this regulation, Ibn al-Qåsim concludes the admissibility of the blind man's testimony in the divorce. Again we have an abstract example because the man and his neighbour are not individualised. In arriving at a judgement, it is irrelevant that the man divorcing his wife is a neighbour of the witness and that the witness cannot see him because a wall separates the estates. The specific details of the case make it more probable that the example is in fact based on legal practice.
In the same text, Sa˙n¥n ponders his decision in the case of an individual who asserts that two envoys did not obey the order to buy a special slave. Both envoys deny the accusations and no witnesses are available. It is the opinion of Ibn al-Qåsim , who remarks that he has had no information from Målik, that the decisive assertion is that of the two envoys (al-qaul qauluhumå) as the mandate has been acknowledged 18 . The case is discussed in the abstract. It is remarkable that there are two envoys. This fact is irrelevant for the solution or the comprehension of the case. Once again the case seems to be based on a factual occurrence.
Complex and Uncommon Details
One argument for the origin in legal practice of a case mentioned in lawbooks in that complex or uncommon facts cannot be explained by their systematic context. As a rule, these facts are indicative of a basis in fact rather than speculation. oaths, if the heirs refuse to take their oaths, and the heirs will have no right on the rest of the estate, if the creditors' claim has been paid. All these circumstances lend weight to the hypothesis that the regulation is based on an actual case which is described incompletely.
Technical Regulations
Technical regulations also take legal practice into account in serving the execution of dogmatically relevant regulations. On their own, they are of little dogmatic value, relating mostly to formal proceedings. Their origin in legal practice is therefore quite probable.
Some Mudauwana regulations concerning witness testimony are mainly technical in nature: If it is the responsibility of the plaintiff to give evidence in a lawsuit, the qåË• will ask him to do so. Such is the case in an abstract example described by Ibn al-Qåsim in which the recipient of a gift (mauh¥b lahu) sues the giver Ibn Rushd in the Bidåya regulates that a judgement (˙ukm) be passed only after 
Topics of Legal Practice
In the fur¥ c works there are many regulations whose topic originates from legal practice or deals with its problems. None of these is of a particularly technical nature. The contents of a kitåb al-qåË• can be witness evidence or judicial precedent. As in the previous example, the man travelling to Ifr •qiyå recognises his lost animal in Fusãåã. He sues its possessor, brings witness testimony (baiyina) and wins the action.
The possessor maintains that he purchased the animal in Syria. He has the right (˙aqq)
to take the animal to Syria and sue the seller for recourse 33 . With a letter from the qåË• in Fusãåã he can prove to the qåË• in Syria that he was condemned to give the animal back to its rightful owner.
The protraction of a lawsuit resulting from distance between the parties necessitates interlocutary injunctions. In the following regulation of Målik laid down by
Ibn al-Qåsim in the Mudauwana, the plaintiff sustained an action for restitution.
The object at issue is handed over with a security deposit until such time as he can bring full evidence: If suing for the restitution of a slave, incomplete evidence suffices -i. e.
one rather than two direct witnesses (shåhid, pl. shuh¥d) or only a hearsay witness (samå c ) 34 -and the slave will be returned. In exchange he has to deposit the value (q•ma) of the slave. This procedure enables the plaintiff to bring full evidence. Therefore, he is allowed to travel with the slave to the domicile of the witnesses to present full evidence to the qåË• of that village 35 . As a rule, the giving of evidence before the qåË• presupposes the presence of the claimed object 36 . If the plaintiff brings full evidence and the slave is awarded to him, he can reclaim the sum on deposit. If he is not able to support his claim with appropriate evidence, he must return the slave in exchange for the deposit. This regulation is appropriate in the case of the runaway slave, a common occurance in legal practice. When the slave was found in a remote location, there was a practical necessity for such proceedings. •da) and there is the risk that the debtor (ghar•m) might disappear, or it takes too much time to present the witnesses, it will be admissible first to let the defendant take the oath and then to hear the witnesses. If the witnesses stay at a village at a distance of not more than three days' travelling time, they
will not be heard after the defendant's oath 39 .
In the case of absent witnesses, the plaintiff's claim is provisionally secured by arresting the defendant, especially in claims concerning the body of the defendant. Ibn al-Qåsim in the Mudauwana presents the following regulation: In suing for retaliation (qißåß)
because of injuries (jirå˙åt) or something else referring to the body, the defendant will be arrested on condition that the plaintiff (mudda c •) has already brought a witness (shåhid), asserts a "present evidence (baiyina ˙åËira)" 40 and announces presentation in court the next day. If a man asserts that another has committed a ˙add crime and his witnesses can be presented by the next day, the accused will also be arrested. In neither case will a personal guarantor for the defendant or accused be taken 41 . The arrest ensures that the defendant or accused will not escape retaliation or punishment.
Human mobility causes problems in legal practice when a party involved in a case is unknown at the place of jurisdiction. In the Mudauwana, Ibn al-Qåsim discusses the following example: Witnesses (shuh¥d) testify sexual intercourse between a man and a woman. The accused asserts that the woman is his wife or his slave, thereby entitling him to engage with her in intercourse, but the witnesses do not know this to be true. If all involved come from the village where the intercourse occured, the man will not be punished for unchastity (zinå), if he brings full evidence (baiyina) of his assertion 42 .
The fact that the witnesses know nothing about the marriage makes it probable that the man is untruthful. A wedding being a public event, the villagers would be aware of it. If the man and the woman come from another village, the man will not be punished either if the woman supports his claim 43 . In this example, witness ignorance is not synonymous with an untruthful claim. Besides, it would be difficult for the accused to defend himself because he would hardly find witnesses for the fact of having married or purchased a slave in another village. So Ibn al-Qåsim 's discussion seems to be justified by practical reasons.
In the Mudauwana, hearsay testimony (shahådat as-samå c ) is discussed. Within this context, we find an example in which the problem of human imperfection is regulated by real life: A man overhears a legally relevant remark while passing by. Someone claims that another has killed or been unchaste or divorced from his wife. Later on, the overhearer is asked to testify to this utterance. The problem here is that overheard speech can be incomplete or taken out of context. Ibn al-Qåsim relates two Målik opinions. In early times, Målik rejected such testimony, but according to his later opinion, such testimony was admissible. Ibn al-Qåsim begs to differ, admitting the testimony only on condition that the passer-by has overheard the utterance completely 44 .
II. Legal Practice Arguments which Justify Legal Institutions and Regulations
The influence of legal practice in the Sharia can also be seen in the justification of institutions and regulations through the necessities of legal practice to some degree. This argument is often pronounced explicitly, but in some cases it can be inferred from circumstances. Legal institutions and regulations seek to protect rightful owners against loss and defendants against unjustified claims.
Protection of the Owner against the Loss of a Right
Ibn al-Qåsim seeks to secure the right to administer justice by stating in the Mudauwana that the seat (majlis) of the qåË• should neither be elevated nor screened, allowing ordinary men and women to come to him 45 . This regulation is a necessary expedient because people would not otherwise approach 46 . This right is based on an according experience of legal practice.
Several legal institutions and regulations exist to take the claimant's evidence. Ibn al-Qåsim also reports that in Medina Målik's judgement is based on hearsay testimony 49 .
The testimony of minors (shahådat aß-ßibyån) has also to be mentioned here. The
Malikites admit it in assault and partly in manslaugther between minors only immediately after the event and if no one has tried to influence them 50 . These restrictions are based on the material consideration that the testimony of minors is less trustworthy than that of adults. Ibn Rushd states explicitly that minors must not be separated to prevent false testimony 51 . As long as the minors have not been separated following the quarrel and nobody has influenced them, their testimony will be considered as exceptionally trustworthy. Considering the distrust concerning the testimony of minors, it is difficult to explain why their testimonies are admitted at all in assault and partly in manslaughter cases. This could be expedient as in such circumstances adults are often not present.
Assault and manslaughter claims could not be successful if the plaintiff is unable to offer evidence 52 . Ibn Rushd seems to refer to this necessity when he calls Målik's admission (ijåza) of minors' testimony concerning manslaugther an analogy based on common weal (qiyås al-maßla˙a) 53 .
According to Koran 2, 282, witness testimony must be given by two men or one man and two women. If testimony is given by female witnesses only, this regulation enables the party holding the burden of proof to testify, even if there are no male witnesses. (dimå') (claims for retaliation and blood-money) would be lost, because the crime was not committed in public. It is therefore qasåma's responsibility to deter people from committing murder and manslaughter 58 . Within the context of discussing the admissibility of the qasåma, Ibn Rushd also states in his Bidåya that the traditional procedure (sunna) is designed to protect against murder and manslaughter (dimå'). Whilst these crimes are numerous, witnesses are rare because such crimes are usually committed out of sight 59 .
Protection of the Defendant against Unjustified Claims
Legal practice is reflected in several institutions and regulations which serve to protect the defendant against unjustified claims. For example, the defendant's oath , introduced a procedure by which the qåË• admits a witness only on the condition that his integrity is proved and established by an official pronouncement (tazk•ya) 66 . Based on historical sources, the qåË• had assistants, known as muzakk¥n 67 , to investigate the integrity of witnesses.
These innovations were introduced firstly into the Mudauwana. According to Målik's opinion as quoted in this text, witnesses whose integrity ( c adåla) is well known to the qåË• do not require a pronouncement of their integrity. But if the qåË• has no information about an individual, he will question others 68 . The assistant is first mentioned by Ibn al-Qåsim , who states that the qåË• should choose a man to investigate the witness 69 .
Testimony which is suspected of subjectivity is not admitted 70 . wife were not suspect. They believed that human character deteriorated in a later period and therefore, with the passage of time, the testimonies of close relatives were no longer acceptable 73 . Obviously, it was necessary for legal practice to place restrictions on testimony in favour of relatives. This is justified by the decline in moral standards.
In legal practice, the parties involved in a case are often ignorant of their procedural rights. This may be due to legal ignorance or the variety of jurists' legal opinions and their different interpretations. Thus it is the responsibility of the judge to clarify procedural rights. In the Mudauwana, Ibn al-Qåsim 's opinion is that if the party against whom testimony is given does not know his right to accuse the witness of unrighteousness, the qåË• must explain it to him. He may have knowledge regarding the witness's integrity 74 . In order to justify this regulation, Ibn al-Qåsim draws an analogy from a •n) , or if he should ask the plaintiff to swear first. Målik stated that the qåË• had not to condemn the defendant until the plaintiff had been given the opportunity to swear an oath and this right had been explained to him. The parties were often ignorant that the oath was transmitted to the plaintiff after refusal by the defendant 75 . Målik allowed that the Medinan legal practice of transmitting the oath to the plaintiff was rejected by many legal scholars, especially the Hanafites 76 .
C. Final Reflections
Legal Practice in Malikite Lawbooks
Legal practice permeated the lawbooks of the Sharia in various ways. Early legal practice has found its way into the Sharia from such legal sources as the Koran and ˙ad•th to the degree that they included legal practice. Historical legal practice may still correspond to the current legal practice of that age but it can be out of date. However, formerly current legal practice, herein discussed, is incorporated into the lawbooks by the legal scholars. The extent of such incorporation depends inter alia on the type and extent of the lawbooks and on their intention. The Malikite law of procedure up to the 6 th /12 th century can be described through an examination of the four most important and fully edited Malikite lawbooks.
In the Muwaããa' we find extensive historical legal practice in the form of a˙åd•th, which was not investigated in this article, and to a lesser extent, the contemporary legal practice of the author. Such reference to legal practice is not surprising. It is the intention of this book to present a survey of the commonly accepted tradition (sunna) and practice ( c amal) of law in Medina, accompanied by a gloss 77 . The predomination of historical over contemporary legal practice is based on the general local consensus which developped historically since the time of the successors of the prophet's companions, the prophet's companions, and occasionally the prophet himself.
It seems reasonable to suppose that at the time of the Muwaããa', historical legal practice still corresponded to the current legal practice of that age.
What was once current legal practice permeated into the Mudauwana through the maså'il-character 78 The defendant's oath is, as a rule, considered necessary to protect the defendant from unjustified actions 81 . The qåË•'s letter serves to surmount the distance between the parties involved in a case and between these parties and the object sued for. The pre-Islamic institution of the qasåma remains current because in legal practice it was difficult to offer evidence of manslaughter.
Numerous regulations or abstract case-regulations are likely also based on legal practice.
These regulations concern the hearing of witnesses testimony and court procedure. They also refer to the testimony concerning the overheard statement of an unseen third party and the testimony of a witness suspected of false declarations because of his relationship to a party involved in the case. Furthermore, proceedings in special constellations probably derive from legal practice especially in exchange of quËåt, in cases of distance between the parties involved or between such a party and the object which is sued
for, or when claims should be provisionally secured. Finally, there also exist rules of evidence which demonstrate their basis in an actual case. They mostly concern the proceeding when there are no witnesses. 
